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INTRODUCTION

Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) are currently being developed for
therapeutic and recreational purposes and are expected to be widely used in
the next two decades. Legal scholars have recently begun considering the
ethical and legal implications of future use of BCIs. Some point out the
peculiarities BCIs entail. Most notable is the fact that BCI-technology
enables its users to affect the world using devices such as robotic arms,
prosthesis, or other machines, while the execution of commands in such
devices runs through computers directed by brain signals which, in contrast
to usual forms of actions, does not involve bodily movement at all.1 Others
call for recognizing new human rights in the age of neurotechnology to
protect the mind, the last refuge of individual freedom and self1

Steffen Steinert et al., Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer
Interfaces and Disembodied Agency, 32 PHIL. & TECH. 457–82 (2019).
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determination, from governments and companies gaining unprecedented
access to components of mental information and abusing BCI-technology to
influence individuals’ capacity to govern their behavior freely.2 However,
given the early stage of these emerging technologies’ development, the legal
literature on this matter remains sparse. Scholars have yet to propose a
concrete regulatory model that ensures the integrity of BCI-technology and
protects users from unknown external manipulations. Without adequate
safeguards, access to the neural processes that underlie conscious thought
risks profound violation of individual privacy with the potential to subvert
free will; personal identity, agency, and moral responsibility may be
diminished. Such outcomes could change the nature of human societies and
humanity.
This conference paper will cover the legal implications of BCIs and
present examples of normative inconsistencies concerning the use of BCIs.
This paper will explore the change BCI-technology can bring to human
society’s nature, address BCIs from the perspective of law, policy, and public
interest, and advocate for a comprehensive reform of neuro-rights.
A. What Are Brain-Computer Interfaces?
BCIs are systems that translate the brain’s electrical activity into
signals controlling external displays and devices, such as cursors on
computer screens, Internet browsers, robotic arms, switches, or prosthetic
limbs.
BCIs are devices that can read brain signals and convert them into
control and communication signals. These are artificial systems that bypass
the body’s efferent pathways (normal neuromuscular output channels);
instead of using peripheral nerves and muscles, BCIs directly measure brain
activity then translate and record it into matching control signals for BCI
applications in a translation procedure that includes signal processing and
pattern recognition done by a computer.3

2

Marcello Ienca & Roberto Andorno, Towards New Human Rights in the Age
of Neuroscience and Neurotechnology, 13 LIFE SCI., SOC’Y & POL’Y (2017); Rafael
Yuste & Sara Goering, Four ethical priorities for neurotechnologies and AI, 551
NATURE 159 (2017).
3
BERNHARD GRAIMANN, BRENDAN ALLISON & GERT PFURTSCHELLER, BrainComputer Interfaces: A Gentle Introduction, in BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACES:
REVOLUTIONIZING HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 1–28, 1–4 (Bernhard
Graimann, Brendan Allison, & Gert Pfurtscheller eds., 2010).
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The first BCI was introduced in 1964 when Dr. Grey Walter
surgically implanted electrodes in the motor areas of a patient’s brain and
connected them to a slide projector. Dr. Grey asked the patient to press a
button to move forward slides at his own free decision (boredom, curiosity,
or otherwise), but what advanced the slides was the amplified signal from the
electrodes implanted in the patient’s motor cortex.4 That was the first time
that control of an external device without movement was achieved. Since
then, BCI research has focused on therapeutic purposes - developing control
and communication systems for people suffering from severe medical
conditions such as complete paralysis or locked-in syndrome - to provide
users with essential assistive devices. With the advances in BCI technology,
it has become appealing to users with less severe disabilities and offers new
means of treating stroke, autism, and other disorders.
What is more, BCIs have become appealing to healthy individuals as
well for enhancement purposes. At Neuralink’s launch event, Elon Musk
stated his venture’s objectives are to understand and treat brain disorders,
preserve and enhance healthy brains, and create a well-aligned future.5 The
Royal Society assesses that by 2040 neural interfaces for therapeutic
purposes will evolve and expand.6
The current medical research has shown that you can read neurons
in human brains, which is an essential proof of concept that this could be
done. But, current BCIs are attached to big wires and boxes that come out of
the patient’s head, which may cause a risk of infection, and they are not
comfortable.
Tech companies are working against the clock to develop this
technology for both therapeutic and recreational purposes. Facebook has
invested about 500 million dollars in a company that connects the brain to
computers using non-invasive technology.7 Elon Musk invested 100 million
dollars from his personal capital in the Neuralink venture that develops
4

DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 167 (1991).
Neuralink, Neuralink Launch Event, YOUTUBE (July 16, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-vbh3t7WVI.
6
ROYAL SOCIETY, IHUMAN: BLURRING LINES BETWEEN MIND AND MACHINE
58-61 (2019), https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/ihuman/report-neuralinterfaces.pdf.
7
Charlotte Jee, Facebook Is Buying a Startup That Makes a Wristband To
Control Computers With A Twitch, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/09/24/132908/facebook-is-buying-abrain-machine-interface-startup-to-further-its-ambitions-in-the-field/.
5
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invasive BCIs aimed at helping patients with paralysis or amputated limbs
regain the ability to communicate with their environment. He has not hidden
that the ultimate goal is to connect us directly to machines to improve
ourselves with artificial intelligence.8 Twenty years from now, the estimates
are that the use of BCIs for therapeutic purposes will evolve and expand and
that BCIs for enhancement purposes will become widely used for gaming,
fitness, and well-being. When put into practice, this technology is expected
to bring about some inconsistencies to the legal system as we know it.
B. Categorization of BCIs
There are three categories for operating BCIs: active, reactive, and
passive BCIs.9
Active BCIs – Active BCIs derive outputs from consciously
controlled brain activity independent of external events.10 In active BCIs, the
user intentionally performs mental tasks that create a particular brain activity
pattern, which the BCI system detects.11 One common mental strategy is
motor imagery. In this technique, the user imagines moving parts of her body
– typically a hand, foot, and the tongue, for their comparatively large and
topographically different motor and somatosensory cortex areas – without
actually moving them. The patterns produced by the motor imagery are
similar to the patterns elicited by actual movements and are directly
connected to the normal neuromuscular output pathways. For example, some
BCIs can detect if the user is imagining moving her left hand, right hand, or
feet, allowing three signals to be mapped as commands for the BCI to
perform, such as to move left, right, and select.12 Moreover, Aflalo et al.
implanted two microelectrodes in the posterior parietal cortex of a tetraplegic
patient and asked them to perform motor imagery. The researchers were able
to read out the intentions of action planning from the posterior parietal cortex,
where the motor intentions are formed before their transmission to the motor

8

Catherine Clifford, Elon Musk’s Brain-Computer Interface Company
Neuralink Has Money And Buzz, But Hurdles Too, CNBC (Dec. 5, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/05/elon-musks-neuralink-bold-ideas-hurdles.html.
9
Thorsten O. Zander et al., Enhancing Human-Computer Interaction with Input
from Active and Passive Brain-Computer Interfaces, in BRAIN-COMPUTER
INTERFACES 181–99 (Desney S. Tan & Anton Nijholt eds., 2010).
10
Id.
11
Steinert et al., supra note 1.
12
GRAIMANN, ALLISON & PFURTSCHELLER, supra note 3, at 11–13.
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cortex. The reading was used to control external devices, including a robotic
limb and a cursor.13
Reactive BCIs – Reactive BCIs derive outputs from brain activity
arising in reaction to external stimuli, which is indirectly modulated by the
user for controlling an application.14 A commonly used paradigm is P300based selection. A P300 wave is an event-related potential (ERP) component
produced when the brain detects stimuli that deserve a person’s attention. It
is a neural signature of the form of positive (P) deflection in the EEG about
300 milliseconds after the onset of the stimuli (hence P300).15 In P300-based
selection BCIs, a sequence of stimuli, e.g., letters, are presented before a user,
and she has to focus her attention on the letter she wishes to choose. The BCI
system detects a P300 signal in response to her selection, indicating her
selected letter.16 This brain signal is used for different BCI applications:
P300-based BCI systems are optimal for spelling characters with high speed
and accuracy (compared to other BCI strategies such as motor imagery);17
they have shown success in operating environmental control systems; 18 they
have been implemented for controlling Internet browsing;19 they enable
creative expression by facilitating brain-painting.20
Passive BCIs – Passive BCIs are systems that derive their output
from arbitrary brain activity without the purpose of voluntary control for
enriching human-computer interaction with implicit information.21 Passive
13

Tyson Aflalo et al., Decoding Motor Imagery from the Posterior Parietal
Cortex of a Tetraplegic Human, 348 SCI. 906–10 (2015).
14
Swartz Center for Computational Neuroscience, UCSD, Thorsten Zander:
Passive
and
Reactive
BCI,
YOUTUBE
(Mar.
27,
2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6LeiWshbaNM.
15
John Polich, Updating P300: An Integrative Theory of P3a and P3b, 118
CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 2128–48 (2007).
16
Steinert et al., supra note 1.
17
Christoph Guger et al., How Many People are Able to Control a P300-Based
Brain–Computer Interface (BCI)?, 462 NEUROSCIENCE LETTERS 94–8 (2009).
18
Yoji Okahara et al., Operation of a P300-Based Brain-Computer Interface by
Patients with Spinocerebellar Ataxia, 2 CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY PRACTICE
147–53 (2017).
19
José L. Sirvent et al., P300-Based Brain-Computer Interface for Internet
Browsing, in 71 TRENDS IN PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT
SYSTEMS 615–22 (Yves Demazeau et al. eds., 2010).
20
Jana I. Münßinger et al., Brain Painting: First Evaluation of a New Brain–
Computer Interface Application with ALS-Patients and Healthy Volunteers, 4
FRONTIERS IN NEUROSCIENCE (2010).
21
Zander et al., supra note 9.
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BCIs monitor a user’s brain activity without needing her to carry out mental
tasks,22 allowing real-time analysis of bio-signals aimed at quantifying
insights such as mental and emotional states. 23 Predating passive BCIs have
been proposed for detecting forms of mental workload,24 and perception of
self-induced errors.25 Current trends include applying passive BCI for
driving, aviation, training, and expertise assessment in operative
environments such as hospitals and public transport, team resources
evaluation where the success of the task is based on the ability to do effective
teamwork, a commercial application like gaming and neuromarketing.26
C. What the Future Holds
In healthcare, BCIs demonstrate remarkable potential to help people
replace or restore functions that have been compromised by illness or injury.
The most immediate target for clinical BCI research is the locked-in
syndrome and advanced ALS patients to whom BCIs are expected to restore
basic communication. Other diseases and injuries interfere with mobility.
Some conditions — such as cervical spinal-cord injury, brain-stem stroke,
ALS, and other motor neuron diseases: Guillain-Barrè syndrome,
neurofibromatosis, multiple sclerosis, spastic tetraplegia, and “watershed”
distribution bilateral strokes — can even result in tetraplegia, which makes
restoration of mobility another primary goal of BCI research, even in small
amounts such as hand grasp. Mobility is also a priority for people with
paraplegia, most commonly caused by injury to the spinal cord. However, it
could also result from thoracic/lumbar/sacral spinal-cord injuries, post-polio
syndrome, multiple sclerosis, neurofibromatosis, artery of Adamkiewicz
ischemia, spastic diplegia, some types of muscular dystrophy, and bilateral
anterior cerebral artery vasospasm. Also, amputation of one or more limbs
due to trauma, vascular disease, or for therapeutic purposes in cases of
cancers or infections is another cause of decreased ability to move where
BCIs might help restore mobility by providing control of powered
22

Steinert et al., supra note 1.
P Aricò et al., Passive BCI Beyond the Lab: Current Trends and Future
Directions, 39 PHYSIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT 08TR02 (2018).
24
Guido Dornhege et al., Improving Human Performance through Real-Time
Mental Workload Detection, in TOWARD BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACING 409-22
(2007).
25
Benjamin Blankertz et al., Single Trial Detection of EEG Error Potentials: A
Tool for Increasing BCI Transmission Rates, in 2415 ARTIFICIAL NEURAL
NETWORKS — ICANN 2002 1137–43 (José R. Dorronsoro ed., 2002).
26
Aricò et al., supra note 23.
23

I.334

U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y

[Vol. XV No. 1

wheelchairs, hand orthoses, robotic arms, or powered exoskeletons. Loss of
autonomic functions (e.g., bladder and bowel control, sexual function,
regulation of heart rate, blood pressure, and body temperature) can
significantly impact an individual’s health, potentially mediated by BCIs.
Because autonomic functions are in large part neurally based, BCI
technology can contribute to their restoration. Also, BCIs can help
supplement standard therapies to improve functional outcomes in stroke
rehabilitation and help manage other neurological or psychiatric illnesses,
e.g., epilepsy and other cognitive and mood disorders.
BCIs have a range of other possible uses in addition to serving as
assistive technology for rehabilitation and other therapeutic purposes. For the
general population, non-medical BCI uses fall into three categories. First,
BCI systems might be used to optimize performance in conventional
neuromuscular tasks. Meaning, the devices might intervene when attention
reduces or modify workload when it gets to a level that is likely to result in
diminished performance and errors. Second, BCI systems might be used to
enhance neuromuscular performance beyond that possible conventionally.
For example, BCI detection of EEG features specific to target stimuli might
increase speed and accuracy in a detection task, BCI recognition of EEG
premovement potentials might enable shorter reaction time, or BCI error
detection might allow the canceling or correction of mistake. Third, BCIs
will enable the creation of systems that broaden or enrich life experience
through media-related activities (e.g., internet access), new methods of
artistic expression, or appealing new computer games that engage the interest
of numerous people regardless of disability.
It is commonly known that technology advances faster than the law
– the “pacing problem” – and that today’s legal practice may prove futile
when applied to tomorrow’s legal challenges. For example, the internet was
initially designed as a research project when security and privacy issues were
not a critical concern. However, with the expansion of the internet, we now
face legal cases dealing with these matters daily without having prepared
solid groundwork, and we adapt regulations “on-the-go.” The most
prominent current example that illustrates the “pacing problem” is techgiants now facing antitrust hearings in front of the American Congress
concerning their market dominance, as well as the movie The Social
Dilemma27 that reveals the dangerous impact of social media networks on
27

THE SOCIAL DILEMMA (Netflix release, Sept. 9, 2020).
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human society. Hence, it is crucial to get ahead of the use of BCIs and design
legal doctrines to accommodate the legal implications of these innovations.
II.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

A. BCI-Mediated Action
In the field of criminal law, a BCI-mediated action performed by a
brain-controlled prosthetic limb does not satisfy the criminal law’s
fundamental requirements of actus reus and mens rea. The principle of
conduct – the actus reus – requires that a criminal act, or an unlawful
omission of an act, must have occurred; a person cannot be held liable for
just thinking criminal thoughts. It is customary to understand the ‘act’ as a
person’s bodily movement contributing to the offense's occurrence.
However, the use of BCIs is problematic for criminal law as the traditional
doctrine of understanding the act requirement as a bodily movement is not
compatible with BCI-mediated actions.
A conventional action differs from BCI-mediated action. In
conventional action, the bodily and muscle movements constitute the action,
whereas, in BCI-mediated action, it is a mental act that triggers and controls
a device by realizing neural correlates of thought activity. The outcomes in
the world are results of devices such as robotic arms, prostheses, or other
machines, operated through a computer and directed by brain signals. Thus,
a BCI-mediated action does not satisfy the law’s ‘action’ requirement, which
includes willed bodily movement; this creates a gap and serves as a basis for
updating legal definitions.28
BCIs allow users to control devices without moving their bodies. The
users imagine certain things, and the BCIs read the neural activity and operate
the output device accordingly. Users who affect the world using BCIs do not
perform any conduct, so when they commit crimes using BCIs, it is unclear
how they have satisfied the actus reus. But imposing differential criminal
liability on people based on how they committed the violation – whether by
a bodily movement or by a BCI-mediated action – would be unfair. So, it
seems that BCI-mediated actions should be qualified to satisfy the ‘act’
requirement – the question is: how?
The most intuitive and plausible way of remedying this gap would
be to qualify a BCI-mediated action as a bodily movement. We can do that
28

Stephen Rainey, Hannah Maslen & Julian Savulescu, When Thinking is
Doing: Responsibility for BCI-Mediated Action, 11 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 46–58
(2020); Steinert et al., supra note 1.
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by recognizing neural activity as an indicator of movements. The factual
basis of the offense is perceived as an objective dimension that comprises all
physical components of the offense in the tangible world. The core of the
‘act’ is a bodily movement that is currently understood as muscle activation.
However, the physiological system allows motion – the musculoskeletal
system – to move on commands from the brain in the form of neurons firing
electrical pulses. Until now, muscles have been the sole executors of brain
commands and the only observable and measurable markers for their
occurrence. With BCIs bypassing the body’s biological muscular output
channels, they may allow a new array of outputs to affect the world.
However, they still rely on electrical pulses to initiate intentional movement.
One way of solving this problem would be to shift focus from where the
action ends to where it begins.
Recognizing neural activity as an indicator of movements will satisfy
the factual basis of the offense. The core of the ‘act’ is a bodily movement
currently understood as muscle activation. Until now, muscles have been
both the sole executors of brain commands as well as the sole observable and
measurable markers for the occurrence of such executions of brain
commands. With BCIs bypassing the body’s biological muscular output
channels, they allow a new array of outputs to affect the world. Nevertheless,
they still rely on electrical pulses to initiate movement. These electrical
pulses are objective and physical measures indicating the initiation of the
brain commands’ execution process that could be measured by objective
external means in accordance with the factual basis of the offense.
Two things are important to emphasize with this regard: First, as
Kramer Thompson notes, not every brain activity is an act, similar to not
every bodily activity being an act/action. For example, neural activity
responsible for maintaining the body’s homeostasis is not an act rather an
activity.29, 30 Second, qualifying brain acts to satisfy the ‘act’ requirement
does not entail criminalizing thoughts. For a consequential offense to occur,
there must be a causal relationship between the act and the outcome in the
world stipulated in the offense. Causation has a two-prong test: factual and
legal. Factual causation means that the offender’s act constitutes an essential

29

Kramer Thompson, Committing Crimes with BCIs: How Brain-Computer
Interface Users Can Satisfy Actus Reus and be Criminally Responsible,
NEUROETHICS (2019)
30
Rainey, Maslen, & Savulescu, supra note 29.
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link in the chain of events that produced the end result and is determined by
the NESS (Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set) and the “but-for” tests.
Scholars have expressed concerns that if the act is satisfiable by
neural activity, a user’s action may satisfy the act requirement before she is
aware of performing it or even having the intention to perform it.31 While a
valid argument, this criticism is not different from the criticism of the Libet
experiment on free will, which had previously established that decisions are
unconsciously made in the brain and only later made it into consciousness
once the decision signal had become strong enough.32 The question of
whether we have free will is a profound question at the very heart of the
foundations of the criminal system. The author of this paper strongly believes
that these foundations are in need of a reconsideration in light of recent
discoveries in neuroscience and epigenetics; however, this reconsideration is
beyond the scope of this conference paper as it will only focus on BCIs.
Having said that, some scholars have expressed concerns that if the
act is satisfiable by neural activity, a user’s action may satisfy the act
requirement before she is aware of performing it or even having the intention
to perform it. While this is a valid argument, the criticism is not different
from the criticism that the Libet experiment raised on the notion of free will.
33
These experiments had previously established that even with conventional
acts, decisions are unconsciously made in the brain and only later make it
into consciousness once the decision signal had become strong enough. The
question of whether we have free will is not unique to BCIs. Rather, it’s a
profound question at the very heart of criminal law. This topic is beyond the
scope of this short conference; however, it is covered extensively in Professor
Sapolsky’s book Behave.34
BCI-mediated action involves a lesser degree of control over the
actions they mediate. Recalling that BCIs are classified into three types:
active BCIs that derive outputs from consciously controlled brain activity
independent of external events; passive BCIs that derive their outputs from
random brain activity without voluntary control activation; and reactive BCIs
that derive outputs from brain activity arising in reaction to external stimuli.35

31

Thompson, supra note 31.
Benjamin Libet, Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious
Will in Voluntary Action, 8 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 529–39 (1985).
33
Id.
34
ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE (2017).
35
Zander et al., supra note 9.
32
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Another problem in criminal law arises from the voluntary act
requirement. This legal principle requires all criminal acts to be voluntary
and entail an alternative to act differently, by way of action or abstention.36
Imposition of liability under circumstances where the person had no
possibility to act otherwise undermines criminal justice’s purposes such as
deterrence and directing behavior, and the principles of conduct and guilt.
Another problem that arises from BCI-mediated action is with the
mens rea. BCIs can affect a user’s sense of agency, particularly unique cases
that arise in the combination of BCIs and Intelligent Devices (IDs). Providing
devices with artificial intelligence can significantly enhance the performance
of BCIs and is valuable for the rehabilitation and daily life support of disabled
people. However, confusion may arise when the behavioral control shifts
from the user to the ID, which can affect the experience of the person as
generating the action and may either decrease or increase a user’s sense of
agency and thus her responsibility for the actions.37 To emphasize the
separation of action from the experience of will, Wegner distinguishes
between doing without feeling and feeling without doing. 38 However, free
will entails an ability to act in a different manner.39 Since with BCIs, we have
to think in terms of “go-commands” for specific movements – they lack a
veto control.40 A human agent embedded with a BCI-ID system can, by
merely thinking about a specific action, cause the robot to carry it out without
being able to block the consequences. This principle, to which Metzinger
refers to as the principle of veto-autonomy, causes the distinction between
volition and action to become blurred, and it raises questions regarding when
should we hold a human agent legally culpable? 41 The extent to which one
has free will to control her actions determines criminal responsibility, and if
one’s ability to control her actions is diminished – so should her culpability
be.
36

Gideon Yaffe, The Voluntary Act Requirement, in THE ROUTLEDGE
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 174 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1st ed., 2012).
37
Pim Haselager, Did I Do That? Brain–Computer Interfacing and the Sense of
Agency, 23 MINDS & MACHINES 405–18 (2013).
38
DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 8–9 (2002).
39
Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes
Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON. SERIES
B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 1775–85 (2004).
40
Rainey, Maslen & Savulescu, supra note 29.
41
Thomas Metzinger, Two Principles for Robot Ethics, in ROBOTIK UND
GESETZGEBUNG 40, 40 (2013).
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B. Brain-Hacking
The term brain hacking describes the emerging possibility of
malicious actors accessing BCIs and other neural devices to compromise the
operations of these devices, similar to how computers are hacked. In
computer science, the model designed to guide information security policies
is the CIA triad – Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. A hacker
should not be able to penetrate a device to obtain private information
(confidentiality); a hacker should not be able to interfere with the device’s
settings (integrity); a hacker should not be able to deny access to the device
from its authorized users (availability). In particular, Denning et al. define
the term “neurosecurity” as the protection of the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of neural devices from malicious parties, and they give
examples for attacks against BCIs that might compromise the three tenets of
cybersecurity. These include the wireless hijacking of a prosthetic limb, the
malicious programming of neurostimulation therapy, and the eavesdropping
of a brain implant’s signals to reveal private information.42 Li et al. survey
possible security scenarios and potential attacks against BCIs and classify
them into four categories based on their usage: (i) neuro medical applications
– where they reiterate the example of hijacking a prosthetic limb; (ii) user
authentication – in authentication systems that verify individuals by their
EEG signals, in which scenario a hacker can attack the authentication system
using a synthetic EEG signal; (iii) gaming and entertainment – rely on
standard Application Programming Interfaces (API) to access BCIs that
provide unrestricted access to raw EEG signals for BCI games; (iv)
smartphone-based applications – that are prone to attacks that originate in the
mobile device itself.43 What is more, in addition to the direct harm that results
from the attack against the information technology system in its conventional
form (the CIA triad), attacks against the human brain (and mind) can lead to
indirect harm with profound ethical and legal implications. Ienca and
Haselager emphasize that misusing neural devices for malicious purposes
may not only threaten users’ physical security, but it can influence their
behavior and alter their sense of identity and personhood. This violates moral

42
Tamara Denning, Yoky Matsuoka & Tadayoshi Kohno, Neurosecurity:
security and privacy for neural devices, 27 NEUROSURGICAL FOCUS E7 (2009).
43
QianQian Li, Ding Ding & Mauro Conti, Brain-Computer Interface
Applications: Security and Privacy Challenges, in 2015 IEEE CONFERENCE ON
COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORK SECURITY 663-66 (2015).
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values of autonomy, free will, and self-determination. They call for further
suggestions as to the appropriate legal safeguards ought to be established.44
Now, as seen, there are a few peculiarities that BCIs bring to the legal
arena. But all in all, these peculiarities can be addressed by employing
suitable mechanisms that would enable us to apply the law equally. This is
almost a technical matter. Then, what is the central problem that arises from
BCIs? It is the fact that we are facing a new era that will bring about new
threats to fundamental freedoms.
C. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The privilege against self-incrimination is a legal principle that
prohibits governments from compelling individuals to witness against
themselves involuntarily or to furnish evidence that implicates their
involvement in a crime. The privilege against self-incrimination protects
suspects from the ‘cruel trilemma’ of having to choose between selfaccusation, contempt of court, and perjury. In the United States, the privilege
is outlined in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, stating that no
person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”45 In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment does prevent the government from compelling a suspect to
provide testimonial evidence such as communicative and verbal statements;
however, it does not prevent the government from compelling a suspect to
provide physical evidence such as blood.46 The rationale to the distinction
between physical and testimonial evidence Schmerber created was that the
Fifth Amendment prohibits the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from suspects, not an exclusion of their body as evidence
because the former puts a person in ‘the cruel trilemma’ whereas the latter
does not.47 Interestingly, as Stoller and Wolpe have recognized, emerging
neuro-technologies make a hybrid form of evidence. On the one hand, they
extract information directly from the brain that indicates, e.g., whether a
person is lying or recognizing an object concerning a crime, which is
44
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47
Matthew Baptiste Holloway, One Image, One Thousand Incriminating
Words: Images of Brain Activity and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination
Comment, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 141–76 (2008).

2021]

Neurolaw: Brain-Computer Interfaces

341

testimonial in nature; but on the other hand, they are available in the form of
a physical object, e.g., a brainwave or a flow of blood, without requiring a
verbal response.48 Thus, neuroscientific evidence does not fit the existing
dichotomic framework of testimonial/physical evidence about the privilege
against self-incrimination.49
The complimentary Fourth Amendment, which protects “the right of
people to secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures,”50 also raises issues of privacy and
criminal procedures in varying degrees to different categories of individuals
– suspects, key eyewitnesses, and general members of the population.51 As
for suspects, some argue that there is a high expectation of privacy for brain
activity.52 In contrast, others maintain that the low intrusiveness of noninvasive BCIs might overcome this expectation.53 As for critical
eyewitnesses, Laura Klaming & Anton Vedder discuss the possibility of
improving eyewitness memory using neuro-technologies. However, using
such methods entails a risk of planting misinformation.54 In particular,
Haushaleter refers to eyewitnesses who suffered traumatic brain injury either
due to the crime being investigated or otherwise, and allowing them to
participate in criminal investigation and “testify” in a trial using BCIs.55
D. Evidence
Brain-based lie detection could potentially be relevant for a wide
variety of issues, e.g., to substantiate if one was at the scene of a crime,
evaluate subjective pain, support eyewitness testimony, predict future

48
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behavior at parole hearings, and to consider mental states at sentencing.
There are two prominent techniques for brain-based evidence: EEG measures
electrical activity in the brain, and fMRI detects changes in hemodynamic;
both depend on various factors, including the experimental design, proper
implementation of the design, and proper interpretation of the results. 56 In
using brain scans as evidence, a few issues arise.
BRAIN SCANS. As non-invasive brain imaging techniques have been
rapidly improving in detecting brain activity, attorneys proffer brain scans as
evidence to civil and criminal courts. The legal system is not only interested
in how people act (actus reus) but also in what they were thinking or capable
of thinking when they acted (mens rea).
Owen D. Jones et al. outline concerns relating to neuroscientific
testimony, including varying scientific certainty standards, the use of jargon,
problems in the translation of neuroscientific evidence, and the use of group
averaged data applied to an individual.57 Teneille Brown and Emily Murphy
provide a comprehensive analysis of fMRI use in legal contexts, arguing that
given the status, capabilities, and constraints of currently used fMRI
technologies and techniques, such images should not be admitted into
evidence to prove or rebut criminal mens rea charges.58 Emily Baron and
Jacqueline Sullivan approach the topic from the perspective of the
philosophy of the social, cognitive, and behavioral sciences. They explain
that current criteria for evaluating brain evidence to determine its
admissibility in legal contexts are inadequate, contending that a more
detailed evaluation of the research studies on which such evidence is based
is needed to ensure its effectiveness in legal contexts.59 Shats, Brindles &
Giordano contend that neuroscientific evidence must first be scrutinized
more heavily for its relevance, to ensure that the right question is asked of
neuroscientists, to enable expert interpretation of neuroscientific evidence
56
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within the limits of their field of expertise that allows the judge or jury to
determine the facts in the case.60
LIE DETECTION. Shen and Owens explore a particular context of
law and neuroscience, the use of brain scans as evidence of lying or truthtelling, and illustrate the use of those scans by the landmark 2010 federal
criminal trial United States v. Semrau.61 That case involved the first federal
hearing regarding the admissibility of testimony about brain scans submitted
as evidence of a person lying or telling the truth. They identify five topics
pertinent to future encounters between courts and brain scanning evidence:
experimental design, ecological and external validity, ensuring subject
compliance with researcher instructions, false memories, and making
individual inferences from group data. If scientific progress is sufficient,
someday brain scan evidence will be admissible in new legal contexts. But,
in the case of lie detection — not yet.62
ERP AND BEOS. An Event-Related Potential (ERP) is a measured
brain response that directly results from a specific sensory, cognitive, or
motor event. Electroencephalography (EEG) measures ERP.63 Scholars have
suggested using ERPs in a forensic investigation as part of the various
techniques used to solve crimes such as fingerprints and DNA. The concept
of using a BCI as a forensic tool requires that a suspect take a guilty
knowledge test (GKT) that contains information related to the crime while a
specialist is recording an EEG signal. Then signal analysis is applied to the
recorded electric signal to determine if the crime-related information was of
significance to the suspect or not. If the information is proven significant,
then the suspect is classified as guilty.64 A variant of ERP is the Brain
Electrical Oscillation Signature Profiling (BEOS), which individuals
experience participating in a crime. The technique was developed in 2003 in
India. Currently, investigators use BEOS as a forensic tool in investigation,
60
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and attorneys use BEOS as corroborative evidence in criminal trials.65 This
technology raises disturbing questions concerning criminal procedure,
evidence, and the rights of criminal suspects.
E. Privacy
While BCI-applications are developed to improve the quality of life,
providing access to a user’s brain signals, and the features extracted from
them, they can seriously violate the user’s privacy.66
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
protects the right to privacy. It states, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks
upon his honor and reputation.”67 Similarly, Article 8 of the 1950 European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) stipulates that “everyone has the right
to respect for his private and family life, his home and correspondence.”68
The right to privacy was first defined in 1890 by Samuel D. Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis as “the right to be alone.”69 Judge Posner perceives privacy as
composed of two different interests. One is the interest in being left alone,
and the other is the right of an individual “to conceal discreditable facts about
himself.”70 In Europe, the right to privacy recently gained recognition with
the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), primarily aimed at
giving individuals control over their data considering multinational
corporations’ common practice — especially in media and communication
— to collect and process users’ data for monetary profit.71 The question is:
does the current privacy protection regime apply to mental data as well?
When the UDHR was adopted in 1948, the future challenges of BCIs
and artificial intelligence could not even be imagined. And so, there are no
65
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provisions in the UDHR to tackle new threats created by technological
advances. Rights that were once taken for granted are now exposed to
possible violations.
One of the most worrisome dystopian scenarios about BCIs relates
to their use by the state (and other asymmetric powerful entities like the
military and employers). In China, government-backed surveillance projects
deploy brain-reading technology to detect emotional state changes in
employees on the production line and drivers of high-speed trains.72, 73 In the
U.S., legal scholars analyzed and debated whether the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments provide sufficient protection of mental privacy.74 E.g.,
Farahany argued that “mental privacy is not sacrosanct under either the
Fourth or Fifth Amendment, which provides procedural safeguards but not
substantive ones to protect mental privacy adequately.”75 In a Nature Review
Neuroscience article, the authors maintained that it should be possible to
decode mental states from brain activity — at least in principle — as accuracy
and efficiency remain unclear due to such a decoding process’ inferential
character.76 Indeed, with the use of artificial intelligence algorithms, science
has progressed exponentially in decoding mental states from brain activity.
However, it might exacerbate the problem of biases in forensics when applied
to criminal justice.77
Since Warren and Brandeis declared a “right to privacy,” U.S. court
rulings have established privacy rights by referring to precedent in the Bill of
Rights, such as the Fourth Amendment right to privacy from Katz v. United
States.78 However, these kinds of interpretations do not apply in the
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commercial realm.79 Facebook is currently developing wearable EEG-based
BCIs that read and interpret users’ thoughts, emotions, and intentions to
provide hands-free communication without saying a word to its platform.
This information could enable us to make inferences regarding a user’s
memory, emotional reactions, and conscious and unconscious interests.
When putting this technology into practice, Facebook will gain access to read
the neural and mental activity of millions of users and will be able to detect
brain signals whenever a user’s brain responds to something worth noting.
Thus, Facebook will study user’s preferences and identify political views,
religious views, and sexual orientations—even before the user herself is
conscious about it (in addition to the company’s already enormous databases
on users). It would still be able to sell the user’s data to third parties.
However, neural data differs from mental data, or in the words of
neuroscientist Read Montague, “[y]our mind is not equal to your brain and
the interaction of its parts, but your mind is equivalent to the information
processing, the computations, supported by your brain.”80 Concerning this
data, Bublitz suggests a brain-mind distinction for normative purposes that
subjects different properties to different regulatory regimes. Through the lens
of data protection, both brain data and mental data can link to individual
persons; hence, it constitutes personal data protected by the EU’s GDPR.
Both can be regarded as ‘personally identifiable information’ and receive
protection in the US because there is a reasonable expectation of brain
activity privacy. However, in the words of Nita Farahany, “there are no legal
protections from having your mind involuntarily read.” This means that at
present, no specific legal or technical safeguards protect brain data from
being subject to datamining and privacy-intruding measures similar to other
types of information.
Some may argue that there is not much of a difference between the
data that social media companies are now obtaining from their user, and
analyzing for profit, and between the additional data BCIs will provide them.
They would say that Facebook analyzes our every online move and makes
inferences about our conscious and unconscious online behavior.81 But, there
is a particular concern about neural signals. Each person has control over
79
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their ability to overtly share information of mental states and voluntarily
choose to either express or suppress information. These choices are variants
of expressing or concealing neural information, and a BCI device should not
violate this control. BCIs can violate a person’s agency and bypass her
control over what she shares with the outside world. There is a privacy
violation when the signals are obtained or analyzed for purposes not intended
by the individual because they no longer maintain the ability to mediate their
own information.82
We have to live with the undesirable results of social media, and it is
too late to go back. We do not want the same thing to happen with BCIs; they
are so much more important because they are related to manipulating brain
activity, which is the physical basis of the human mind.
F. Private Law
The most clear, significant, and immediate implications are related
to criminal law issues and privacy issues, but they are not the only ones, such
as intellectual property (IP) law. The academic literature paid little to no
attention to IP from the perspective of neuro-technologies, even more so
BCIs. The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution enables Congress to
secure “to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”83 Copyright law protects original works of
authorship expressed in any tangible medium such as literary, musical,
graphic, architectural works, etc.84 It protects expression in works of
authorship against copying, and it entails three basic requirements: (i) work
of authorship, (ii) original, and (iii) fixed in a tangible medium of
expression.85 The novelty of BCIs in the context of proprietary rights stems
from our recently acquired ability to express brain waves via tangible
mediums. NeuroSky is a manufacturer of BCI technologies for commercial
and recreational use. One of the applications the company offers is Braintone
Art, an EEG-based algorithm (Braintone Art Imagery Generation Engine)
that enables to projection of users’ emotions as abstract art on a digital canvas
using nothing but brainwaves. The company markets this app (and its
supplementary EEG headset) as “EEG art” and a new visual way to express

82

Pratt, supra note 81.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
84
17 USCS § 102.
85
Id.
83

I.348

U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y

[Vol. XV No. 1

creativity.86 Lisa Park is an interdisciplinary artist who attempts to display
human emotion and physiological changes in auditory presentations. She is
using a commercial brainwave sensor (Emotiv EPOC) to musicalize
brainwaves.87 Both visual and auditory examples satisfy the law’s three
requirements: both works of authorship, both original, and both fixed in a
tangible medium of expression. Nevertheless, they can be a topic for legal
debate. A preliminary question is who owns and controls the raw neural data
(EEG scans) obtained from using a consumer device? The relationship
between neural data and BCI users and their control over their neural data is
neither regulated nor standardized.88 Even if the user retains ownership of the
raw neural data, it is still unclear who retains ownership over the finished
artwork, which realization could not occur without the joint effort of both the
artist’s brainwaves and the company’s (probably patent protected) algorithm.
Another law field is tort. Tort law is the legal regime governing when
entities or persons are civilly liable for harm befalling others and compensate
the injured parties for damages. With the expansion of use in BCI devices for
therapeutic, professional, and recreational purposes, users probably cause
property damage and personal injuries due to limits in both controllability of
BCIs using mental states and foreseeability of outcomes inherent in these
devices, which the law will soon need to address.89 Contrary to the gap
described in Section BCI-Mediated Action referring to the establishment of
responsibility, in tort law, there is no requirement for a voluntary bodily
movement, as the law defines an ‘act’ as “an external manifestation of the
actor’s will.”90 Establishing civil liability deals with causation, duties of care,
and negligence – inferred by evaluating the actions at hand compared with a
hypothetical reasonable person's actions in the same situation. However,
cases that involve BCI-mediated action will encompass unique scenarios and
circumstances.91 For example, exoskeleton or prosthetics that harm their
86
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users, others, or property result from unanticipated subconscious thought.92
In one experiment, to mitigate delay in a prosthetic limb's movement,
researchers implanted a (non-AI) BCI into users’ posterior parietal cortex
(PPC), an area associated with movement mapping and planning, and sub- or
pre-conscious thought. The technology predicts and triggers actions before
the user is consciously aware that she will make them.93 Another example is
actions occurring in the convergence of artificial intelligence and BCI, where
free will, autonomy, and agency arise. As a result, it may seem that no one
bears liability.
In trying to resolve the gaps, Rainey et al. propose distinguishing
between “necessary” and “recreational” use of BCIs. Disabled people
causing harm as a result of the necessary use of BCI should not be liable.
After all, they could not act otherwise. In contrast, commercial users causing
harm due to recreational use of BCI should be held liable because they had
an alternative to acting otherwise when they decided to create the risk.94
Bublitz et al. suggest that BCI users bear a specific duty to prevent harm to
others that arise from operating the BCI and thus should be held by liability
for omissions even if not initiated or controlled by them, or by way of
imposing a strict liability regime.95 What seems to be agreed upon by all of
the abovementioned scholars is that tort law cases relating to BCI would
increase, and the legal framework should be updated to accommodate them.
III.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

A. New Human Rights
The rapid advancement in human neuroscience and neurotechnology
open unparalleled possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing, and
manipulating information from the human brain. Such applications challenge
human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended
consequences. Ienca and Andorno analyzed the relationship between
neuroscience and human rights and identified four new human rights that will
become of great relevance in the coming years: (i) the right to cognitive
92
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liberty; (ii) the right to mental privacy; (iii) the right to mental integrity; (iv)
and the right to psychological continuity.96
THE RIGHT TO COGNITIVE LIBERTY. While thoughts had been
considered inherently private in the past, neuro-technologies have changed
the situation and may – in the future – lead users to develop meta-cognition.97
Having their brains monitored, prospective BCI users might change their
inner-life and limit the scope of their thoughts out of fear of exposer, which
in turn would impact their personality and sense of identity, including
cognitive capabilities, intelligence, and fantasies.98 In the age of
technological intrusion into our minds, legal scholars resurrect the concept
of freedom of thought by promoting the idea of “cognitive liberty,” defined
by Sententia as a twenty-first century updated term for “freedom of thought,”
which takes into account the power we now have — and increasingly will
have — to monitor and manipulate cognitive function.99 The right to
cognitive liberty aims at protecting our mental capacities from undesired
influence. It comprises a negative dimension that protects freedom from
interferences by the state and third parties, and a positive dimension that
grants the freedom to self-determine one’s inner sphere, e.g., the content of
a person’s thoughts, consciousness or any other mental phenomena.100 As
Bublitz concisely put it, it is the legal principle that guarantees “the right to
alter one’s mental states with the help of neuro tools as well as to refuse to
do so.”101
THE RIGHT TO MENTAL PRIVACY. The typology of Finn et al.
acknowledges seven different types of privacy concerning protection of
individuals against new and emerging technologies: privacy of the person;
the privacy of behavior and action; privacy of personal communication; the
96
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privacy of data and image; privacy of thoughts and feelings; privacy of
location and space; privacy of association. Frank Tong and Michael Pratte
have argued mental privacy could face enormous new challenges, in both
legal settings and beyond, as there has been no precedent for having the
ability to look into the mind of another human being.102 Recent years have
seen growing attention to the discussion on whether mental privacy should
receive legal protection and in what context. There are many different ways
in which acts may violate a person’s mental privacy:
THE RIGHT TO MENTAL INTEGRITY. The right to personal physical
and mental integrity is protected by Article Three of the EU’s Charter of
Fundamental Rights, stating that “everyone has the right to respect for his or
her physical and mental integrity.”103 The separation between physical and
mental health delineated in Article Three stems from Descartes’ philosophy
of body-mind dualism that views the body and the mind as distinct and
separable. Moreover, almost every legal system has embedded this dualism,
which led the law to systematically afford protection to bodies and brains,
not minds and mental states. For instance, the E.U. Charter of Fundamental
Rights considers mental integrity as the right to mental health from a
psychiatric/psychological perspective.104 With the emergence of neurotechnologies legal scholars are advocating for the law to protect the inner
sphere of persons by broadening the scope of the right to mental integrity so
that it would guarantee not only the right of individuals with cognitive
conditions to access psychiatric treatment instead of additionally ensuring the
right of individuals to protect their mental sphere from harm. Bublitz has
recognized two types of potential damage to the mental sphere: the infliction
of mental injury — i.e., pain, disorder, impairment of mental health, and
mental manipulation — i.e., influences on preferences and choices.105 Indeed,
BCIs can bring about alterations of a person’s neural computation and
perception of their identity.
THE RIGHT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY. BCIs and other
neuro-technologies may also cause unintended alterations in mental states
that are crucial to personality and can affect an individual’s identity. This
right should provide specific normative protection from potential
102
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neurotechnology-enabled interventions involving the unauthorized
modification of a person’s neural computation and harming the victim.
Accordingly, a violation of this right is comprised of three elements: (i) direct
access and manipulation of neural signaling; (ii) unauthorized; and (iii) result
in physical or psychological harm.
Combined, these novel human rights that have been put together, and
suggested by Ienca and Andorno, aimed at assuring anyone could protect her
identity from external influence and reject changes in her brain functions.
Their purpose is to protect us from the possibility of abusing technology to
manipulate our neural activity.106 While the guideline they propose is
essential to the era of neuro-technologies, the law should further define what
kinds of mental phenomena are worthy of protection by their mental
properties and introduce provisions penalizing interferences with mental
integrity rather than expanding the protection of bodily integrity to mental
integrity.107
B. Chile
In Chile, a commission designated to address the challenges of the
future presented, last month, in front of the senate, two law projects that aim
to protect people’s brain data and mental privacy in the face of BCI and
artificial intelligence. The first is an amendment to the constitution that
defines mental identity for the first time in history as a right that cannot be
manipulated. It states that any intervention, even for health reasons, must be
legally regulated.108 The second is a bill that includes fundamental
revolutionary principles,109 that are based on the five principles defined by
Columbia University’s NeuroRights Initiative:110
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1. The first principle is the Right to Personal Identity. This
principle states that boundaries must be developed to prohibit
technology from disrupting the sense of self. When BCIs
connect individuals with digital networks, it could blur the line
between a person’s consciousness and external technological
inputs.
2. The second principle is the Right to Free-Will. This principle
states that individuals should have ultimate control over their
own decision making without unknown influence from external
technologies.
3. The third principle is the Right to Mental Privacy. This principle
states that any data obtained from measuring neural activity
(NeuroData) should be kept private. Moreover, the sale,
commercial transfer, and use of neural data should be strictly
regulated.
4. The fourth principle is the Right to Equal Access to Mental
Augmentation. This principle states that there should be
established guidelines at both international and national levels
regulating the development and applications of mentalenhancement neuro-technologies. These guidelines should be
based on the principle of justice and guarantee equality of access
to all citizens.
5. The fifth principle is the Right to Protection from Algorithmic
Bias. This principle states that countermeasures to combat bias
should be the norm for machine learning. Algorithm design
should include input from user groups to address bias
foundationally.
If passed, Chile could turn into the first country that has a law that protects
neurorights!
C. Technocratic Oath
But, if we genuinely want to protect our NeuroData, we must do so
by dint of design. And to that end, the most current project is Professor Rafael
Yuste’s “Technocratic Oath.” Professor Yuste is drafting an ethical
framework for entrepreneurs, physicians, and researchers developing BCIs
and artificial intelligence.111 Just like as doctors follow the Hippocratic Oath,
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those who design and administer neurotechnology would follow the
“technocratic oath.”
IV.

CONCLUSION

The discussion shows that BCIs – uniquely integrated with artificial
intelligence – entail complex legal matters. Naturally, the field of law that
received the most attention thus far is constitutional law and human rights; it
is central to the understating of legal theory and from which all other rights
and privileges stem. The following field relative to the number of
publications is criminal and procedural law and for a good reason. Both of
these public law fields deal with providing individuals protections against the
asymmetric and disproportional power of governments, which are of direct
concern to the society.
Access to the neural processes that underlie conscious thought
entails access to a level of the self that cannot be consciously filtered.112 This
risks violation of individual privacy and dignity, with the potential to
suppress free will and breach the ultimate sanctuary of human freedom – the
human mind. Personal identity, agency, and moral responsibility may be
diminished by merging neurological and digital experiences. Such could
change the nature of humanity and human societies unless we reform – not
only our laws – but also our perspective on NeuroData and the protections it
should receive.
In a globalized world, where tech companies influence our lives
unhindered, both at the individual and the societal level, linking the brain
directly to digital networks could fundamentally change human societies and
humanity. On October 22, 2020, the Council of Europe adopted resolution
2344 (2020), where it called on its member states to develop specific legal
frameworks that guarantee adequate respect and protection of individual
rights and ensure appropriate bodies exist for the oversight of BCItechnology to ensure effective implementation of the application
frameworks.113 The Council of Europe stated there is an urgent need for
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precautionary regulation now, and the legal community should respond to
this call to action.

